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DEBATE AND DISCUSSION 
 
WHY EVERYTHING WE KNOW ABOUT CRIMINAL  
JUSTICE HISTORY IS WRONG 
Richard W. Ireland1 
 
Introduction 
What I want to consider in this piece is the position of the historiographer of the 
history of crime and punishment and how that position has influenced and may even 
distort the picture of the past which we draw and then pass on. Few nowadays would 
suggest that the historical task is simply an objective one, a recovery of the bald facts 
of the past, unmediated by the researcher’s own background, resources and 
concerns. Even my undergraduate students are happy to debate whether particular 
accounts of, say, the ‘rise of the prison’ are Whiggist or Marxist or Foucauldian and to 
argue the relative merits of those positions. But my purpose here is not to go over 
these 'theoretical' controversies again but rather to examine the often unstated and 
unformulated assumptions which affect our analysis of the past, assumptions related 
to the backgrounds, geographical location, skills and sources which we carry into our 
work as researchers. I say 'we' advisedly: despite the provocation of my title I have 
no desire to hurl brickbats at others from a position of smug self-righteousness. It’s 
not like that at all. But my own position is one which, for reasons which will become 
clear shortly, has left me feeling sometimes a little on the periphery at some of the 
conferences I have attended, some of the conversations I have been party to. I have 
had to examine the factors which perhaps lie behind that feeling of distance. So while 
I do not seek to justify my own position, to advance it as superior, or to convert 
anyone to it I’d like my readers to consider the unspoken assumptions of their own 
research. It’s as simple as that: an exercise in reflection.2  
                                                          
1
 Richard W. Ireland is Senior Lecturer, Department of Law and Criminology, Aberystwyth 
University, rwi@aber.ac.uk 
2
 Even I am beginning to doubt the wisdom of this article and not only because I fear that it 
will make other writers defensive and lose me some friends. I wrote it originally as a piece of 
provocative overstatement, tongue lodged in cheek, self-mockery never far from the fore. Its 
intended audience was the younger scholar, whose presence at the Our Criminal Past 
meetings was, for me, one of the most gratifying features of those gatherings. It was meant as 
a cautionary guide, not a comprehensive literature review. The editors and their anonymous 
reviewer (whom I shall call ‘AR’ and to whom I will ascribe a masculine identity - it’s a guess), 
though kind and supportive, understandably wanted some changes. So out goes all of the 
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Here are some things which I think may explain my own position. I am, by training, a 
lawyer rather than any kind of historian. I live in a village and work in a small town in 
the countryside. That countryside is in Wales, in an area where Welsh is freely 
spoken and where the local agricultural show remains one of the key dates of the 
calendar. My teaching interests include legal anthropology, and medieval (English) 
law, the subject which occupied much of my earlier research and still remains a 
passion.3 Have these factors informed the way that I view events concerning crime 
and the social response to it? Yes, certainly. My point here is not to establish my 
credentials as some kind of naive 'outsider' commentator, but simply to point out that 
some of the questions which I ask of material, and some of the preconceptions I 
carry into my research, come out of this experience of life. Yet because such a 
background is not shared by all who will read these words they may tempt those 
others perhaps to reflect a little on the assumptions and restraints which their own 
backgrounds might suggest. If you do not know your next-door-neighbour’s name, 
still less where their mother lives, you might wish to contemplate whether this might 
affect your view of other times and other societies in which such knowledge was 
commonplace.4 If you were trained within a particular discipline, rather than came to 
it from outside, you might want to see whether what you do reflects that training 
rather than challenges it. ‘The man who conquers his father’, Freud says somewhere, 
‘is a hero’. I think that if we make this gender-neutral and substitute ‘teacher’ for 
‘father’ we may explain something important about academic life.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
humour and in come some defensive qualifications. In a nod to Flann O’Brien’s The Third 
Policeman I will deal with some of their points in an exchange in these footnotes. 
I can, of course, accept that it is entirely possible to find examples of work which evades any 
or all of the pitfalls I discuss in this article (AR tends to cite two examples to counter each of 
those propositions) but I’m still not sure that that possibility invalidates entirely the warnings 
advanced here, which are, as I explain, based on things I’ve seen, heard and read. AR thinks 
I’m setting up straw men. If the reader doesn’t recognise these tendencies at all then he or 
she is free to dismiss them, but s/he might still find it useful to reflect on the possibility of other 
unconscious bias in their own work. But I won’t, always, name names as (the ironically 
anonymous!) AR urges me to. In cases where the examples come from a PhD thesis I’ve 
examined, or the first version of a journal article which I have peer-reviewed, or the paper of 
an unsure presenter at a conference, I wouldn’t want them to carry round early errors for the 
rest of their careers. 
3
 See references at note 4 inter alia. My chapter on the law is in the forthcoming Chaucer in 
Context (I. Johnston ed., Cambridge University Press). 
4
 AR doubts this, but a survey from 2013 reveals that 70% did not know their neighbours’ full 
names and over a third would not recognise those neighbours 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/love-thy-neighbour-most-british-people-
dont-even-know-what-their-names-are-8877725.html. Does this matter? Well I think that it 
explains a great deal, for example, about the efficacy and subsequent decline of shaming 
punishment, see R. W. Ireland Land of White Gloves: A History of Crime and Punishment in 
Wales (Routledge, forthcoming 2015) 87-88). 
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I have gathered here a number of observations which occur to me when I consider 
the state of writing and discussion on the history of crime and criminal justice history. 
Not all of these will strike the reader as in the least surprising or controversial; some 
will be dismissed with an impatient 'of course'! If you’re good at what you’re doing 
then my drawing your attention to them will be redundant, and everybody likes to 
think they are good at what they are doing. But they are points that strike me from 
conferences I’ve attended, papers I’ve read, discussions I’ve heard. So perhaps they 
are worth thinking about. I’ve labelled and numbered them as a series of propositions 
and I’ll suggest how they can act in isolation and combination to send research down 
particular channels. 
 
Proposition 1: Digitisation is the Answer 
Actually my discussion of this first proposition is informed by my own experience of 
the process of digitising archival material, rather than, as my previous details might 
suggest, by my living in a hut with a sheep. I am a big fan of the democratisation of 
research which digitisation brings. Although a technophobe myself I was an early 
convert to the process, my own database of 1,447 records of those remanded for 
felony in Carmarthenshire (South West Wales) between 1844 and 1871 is now well 
over 20 years old and, searchable and for free, is available online to all  
(http://www.welshlegalhistory.org/carms-felons-register.php). It was an early 
experiment and would, no doubt, be rather different if it were done today, but it’s not 
a bad resource, though it remains an underused one. The technical issues relating to 
the construction of databases are not my concern here, we are much better than we 
used to be in that respect.5 The simple digitisation of archives by scanning is helpful 
in many ways, but chiefly in saving time and travel to their point of origin. But 
nowadays we want a database: searchable and open to analysis, and that involves a 
point of ‘translation’ (I mean this in a sense which comprises not only transcription, 
but also generally some form of categorisation; of offences, for example, and of 
standardisation-of spelling, place names etc., - although, again, we’re now much 
better at coping with these). There is absolutely no harm in this, even those of us 
who prefer to trust our own judgment rather than that of another, know that all of us 
are fallible. My own database, compiled with the help of a brilliant Research Assistant 
                                                          
5
 I readily accept that projects like the Digital Panopticon or London Lives are now much more 
sophisticated, and that the work of people like Hitchcock, Shoemaker and Williams, some of 
which was discussed at the London Our Criminal Past meeting, has contributed enormously 
to that process of sophistication.  
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who has since gone on to a very senior position in the archive world, contains errors.6 
A description of one offender’s ‘Complexion’ by the prison officials obviously defeated 
us at the time. It still reads ‘Allegro’ in our database, when common sense, and 
indeed a second glance, clearly demands ‘A Negro’! Nor am I particularly disturbed 
by that lack of intimacy with original documents which the computer database 
dictates, although I would miss the feel of the real thing, and the ‘non-verbal’ 
information which it provides. Was it written in a hurry? Amended? This latter can be 
important, one of the Carmarthenshire felons is described as ‘Fresh, Good Looking’ 
in appearance, three days before dying in custody. Only the fact that the ink of the 
two words has faded to a different base-colour shows that the second word was 
added after the first.7 What really matters, of course, is the type of records digitised 
(see Propositions 2 and 3), and the way we use them (see Proposition 5). 
 
I worry about the transmission of criminal process to data, where problems of original 
reliability are compounded by modern translation. If we accept the concept of 'data' 
we have to bear in mind the problem of 'dator'. The information on our screens 
becomes 'harder' than it might be. We become, I think, less sceptical. My own 
database contains names, occupations, places of birth and last residence of a whole 
cohort of offenders. Or, rather, it doesn’t. It contains the versions of that information 
which were officially recorded. All of these are details for which the primary source 
would often be the prisoner’s own testimony, all of them would be things about which 
the prisoner would have good reason to lie. In some cases I know that the prisoner is 
indeed lying, in some cases the prison authorities suspect it, in others neither I nor 
they have any idea. So we tend to accept that they are true.8  
 
A similar, but more disturbing, tendency is that if a database is constructed which 
contains only courtroom material (indictment, conviction/acquittal, punishment 
imposed), or, the database itself containing more, only that information is used by a 
searcher, the ensuing research will pick up on the end point of a hugely complex 
process, implicating a number of people in a number of decisions. Clearly it won’t 
pick up crimes not reported or not prosecuted or settled before trial. We all know that. 
                                                          
6
 Claire Breay, now a Lead Curator at the British Library. 
7
 George Adams, F.R. no.1036. OK, reproduction can overcome such drawbacks if they are 
used (by both creator and user of the database). 
8
 See Ireland, 'The felon and the angel copier: criminal identity and the promise of 
photography in Victorian England and Wales', in L. Knafla (ed.), Policing and War in Europe 
(Westport, 2002), 53-86 for discussion. 
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But it will also possibly miss such socially crucial material as that with which I am 
familiar from other sources: the initial remand for rape becoming an indictment for 
indecent assault by a Grand Jury and a conviction for common assault by the petty 
jury or, often, an acquittal (which can mean much, much more than ‘he didn’t do it’, 
see Proposition 5). Many readers will indeed be aware of these problems, they are 
hardly new. But the computer has a tendency to iron out our suspicions. Data 
becomes more solid, and then, when subjected to statistical analysis, almost 
diamond-like in its dazzling qualities. ‘38.3% of burglars had two or more previous 
convictions’ seems such a simple, uncontroversial statement, so gloriously, 
seductively, scientific. In one way, it is. But now consider the material it accepts and 
that which it leaves out. Still happy that it’s telling you everything you would really like 
to know about recidivism?9 
 
Proposition 2: ‘If it bleeds, it leads’ 
It’s an old tabloid editor’s maxim, but it dominates the historiography of crime. We 
start discussions with the ‘Bloody Code’, the homicide, the assize case and work 
down, losing interest often well before we reach the drunken punch, the ‘furious 
riding’ of a horse or the adulteration of butter. The atypical is our paradigm, the 
routine exposure of ordinary people to criminality, as perpetrators, victims or 
witnesses, remains less explored. Yes, there is material on petty crime out there,10 
and often, in archival deposits, it exists in tedious abundance, so we must investigate 
the psychology of this dominant standpoint rather than its archival necessity. Let us 
look in the mirror: are we really, as professionals, so far removed from the popular 
obsession with ‘Jack the Ripper’ that we so affect to despise?11 
 
                                                          
9
 Both the editors and AR are unhappy with this section and it may be that I’m simply out of 
touch here. But my point is really not about how databases are created or exactly what they 
contain (I’ve accepted that this has improved hugely over the years) but how they are used: 
it’s the psychology of the user, not the creator, which I’m interested in here. A researcher can 
immediately turn to a database, undertake statistical analysis from it and produce a series of 
conclusions about criminality which look unimpeachable. Great: that’s democratic. But 
expertise in handling record evidence is not, I believe, an innate gift. See my review 
Controlling Misbehavior in England 1370-1600 by Marjorie Keniston McIntosh' in Legal 
Studies, 19, (1999) 118-123. I did recently peer review an article which was statistically 
impressive, but showed little real understanding of the world from which those statistics were 
derived. No, AR, I won’t name the author. Tim Hitchcock doesn’t need my advice; that author 
did though. 
10
 There’s good work, for example, by Shoemaker, King and others. 
11
 Not all the stuff on the Ripper is rubbish, but a great deal is, and it continues to pour out. I 
have a note, but have lost the citation, which reveals that nine books were written on the case 
between 1888 and 1909, but 39 from 1990-1999 alone. 
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Does such a lopsided approach matter? Yes, and it should do, even to those who 
choose deliberately to concentrate on serious crime. Let’s take an example (which 
also incorporates Propositions 3 and 4): the history of imprisonment. If I hear again 
the proposition that ‘before the eighteenth century imprisonment was used for 
detention before trial or before punishment, but not [or, in more sophisticated 
versions, ‘rarely’] as punishment itself’ I shall scream. It is not true, and no amount of 
repetition, no Foucauldian Panoptical dogma, makes it true. Punitive imprisonment 
was entirely familiar in England in the middle ages. If you were a salmon poacher 
then prison was the prescribed penalty in 1285 no less than in 1885. This is not a 
new finding: I wrote about it 30 years ago, Ralph Pugh rather earlier than that.12 What 
is true is that prison was not originally an official (but see Proposition 5) punishment 
for felony. But that is very different, and a rejection of the wider myth allows us to 
grasp a different, more nuanced archaeology of penal thought.13 
 
If we embrace the analysis of petty crime then we might actually find rather more 
significant theoretical problems than those, such as the ‘birth of the prison’, which we 
have been discussing for years. I noticed only recently the conceptual change which 
appears to take place in the history of the practice of ‘binding over to keep the 
peace’. Once a very common means of social control (certainly in Wales) it seems to 
shift from being understood as an undertaking to be within the law rather than outside 
it, i.e. a personal affirmation of acceptance of a normative system, to being one of a 
range of minor penalties within that system. It’s a move from being willing to join a 
                                                          
12
 See C. Harding, B. Hines, R.W. Ireland and P. Rawlings, Imprisonment in England and 
Wales: A Concise History (London, 1985), Ch1; Ireland, ‘Theory and practice within the 
medieval English prison’, American Journal of Legal History, 31, (1987) 55-62; R. Pugh, 
Imprisonment in Medieval England (Cambridge, 1968). 
13
 AR doubts that anyone really believes that myth now. Well the first two hits on a Google 
search for ‘history of prisons’ (The Howard League and Wikipedia) respectively use the 
formulae ‘rarely’ and ‘very rarely’ in their websites. This ‘rarely’ formula is the fig leaf behind 
which lack of research seeks to hide its modesty: if it refers to the range of offences for which 
punitive imprisonment was possible it is demonstrably false, as the list of offences exceeds 
that of medieval felonies in number, if it refers to absolute numbers imprisoned then I’ve never 
seen the figures to support it: but if the total of those imprisoned for misdemeanour, under 
borough custom, in houses of correction, for felony as a result of jury manipulation, for felony 
as a result of findings of benefit of clergy (too often seen as exemption from punishment 
rather than, as originally, a change in its locus and nature) is insignificant then the bar is set 
very high. Take no comfort from the ‘popular’ nature of these sources, even our Gods can err. 
Shoemaker speaks of punitive imprisonment as ‘new’ in the eighteenth century - Tales from 
the Hanging Court (London, 2006) 43: he may mean ‘new’ for violence: only true if we 
discount riot and forcible disseisin. Sharpe in Judicial Punishment in England (London, 1990) 
reports ‘early stirrings of an awareness of the potential of imprisonment as a form of 
punishment’ in the eighteenth century (p.45). And Foucault’s English subtitle is ‘The Birth of 
the Prison’. If AR has missed the huge number of conference papers applying Foucauldian 
theory based on this assumption then he’s been very lucky! 
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club in the first place to being sanctioned for breach of club rules which apply to 
everyone. If I’m right about that then that’s a conceptual shift of infinitely more 
theoretical complexity and importance than the extension of the number of offences 
for which incarceration is regarded as an appropriate penalty. 
 
Proposition 3: Nothing Matters before the Eighteenth Century 
'Outside my period!' We’ve all said it, and of course there’s a point to it. Academic life 
pushes us towards specialisation, towards knowing more and more about less and 
less. No-one can know all of criminal justice history. But that history at present does 
tend to cluster round the eighteenth, and particularly the nineteenth centuries. I 
suspect that this is a tradition within ‘social history’ more generally, and there’s 
certainly enough within that period to keep us going for ages. Indeed, that’s part of 
the appeal, I think; the massive quantity of unexamined archival material, so 
interesting to get to grips with. Of course the criminal still generally appears as an 
object within the archive rather than a subject: records are about criminals rather 
than by them (although the fascinating development of the Victorian prison memoir 
forms an interesting late and partial exception).14 But the records are easy to use: 
they are plentiful, in English and require advanced palaeographical skills only rarely.  
 
Of course the history bit: the pursuit of, selection of, interrogation of, interpretation of, 
analysis of, construction and presentation of argument concerning those records are 
tasks demanding the highest possible skill. But the sources for that history are much 
more accessible than those for, say, the thirteenth century (and don’t be fooled, 
those thirteenth century sources are abundant enough). Does it matter? I think that it 
does. Walk into any ‘prison museum’ and see how much of the history on show there 
is compressed into a period between, say, 1830 and 1880. Read many of our current 
histories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (see also the effects of 
Proposition 2 and Proposition 4) and see how unapologetic they are (indeed, how 
blissfully unconcerned they are) about addressing a system much of whose 
substantive law, procedure and punishments had already evolved and developed 
over a substantial period of time for particular reasons and purposes.15 I don’t want to 
disparage the work being done on the later period, but I would like to see an 
                                                          
14
 For sources relating to which see, eg, P. Priestley, Victorian Prison Lives (Cambridge, 
1985). 
15
 See what I say about benefit of the clergy, jury equity, penal imprisonment in this paper. 
Their later uses are not simply modifications of earlier practice to cope with a Bloody Code 
being questioned after the Enlightenment: they are integral to the foundational history of those 
practices. 
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understanding that crime and courts and trials and punishment have a longer history, 
rather than simply a pre-history. I’d like to see a greater mix of period specialists at 
conferences, a deeper conversation taking place across boundaries of periods which 
we all know in our hearts are largely arbitrary, but which we still cling to anyway.16 
 
Proposition 4: Everything Changes 
This may be seen as simply a by-product of Proposition 3, with which it is certainly 
entangled, but it actually is a separate problem. I was once at a seminar where one 
of my colleagues began a paper by asserting that ‘This was a period of great social 
economic and industrial change’. ‘When wasn’t?’ asked another colleague, 
innocently but profoundly. It’s worth thinking about. The Industrial Revolution (see 
Proposition 3) certainly represents such change. But… the eleventh century saw the 
Norman Conquest, the twelfth the ‘medieval renaissance’ and the birth of the 
Common Law, the thirteenth baronial insurrections, the legal construction and 
deconstruction of feudalism, the fourteenth the Black Death and the Peasants’ Revolt 
etc, etc. 
 
But just as academe pushes us to specialise, it also silently urges us to look for 
novelty, change, for (positive) response. A thesis or a book which charts changes, 
even one which looks at ‘changes and resistances’, looks so much more worthwhile 
than one which ends up by muttering apologetically that, in essence, things remained 
pretty much as they were before! And of course few things remain exactly the same. 
But continuity, or what appears at first sight to be continuity, is important. Where’s the 
full, academic history of the use of the fine, let alone the bind-over (which may or 
may not, as we have seen, be a continuous one)? Where’s the engagement with 
imprisonment for debt (‘Not a crime’, you object. Does that matter? See Proposition 
5)17 Which sort of lives are touched less and which touched more by significant social 
change and how do the former as well as the latter react to it. In rural Wales, in small 
face-to face communities, I have found traditional compensation payments rather 
than prosecution as the response to murder well into the nineteenth century, the use 
                                                          
16
 I didn’t attend all the papers presented, but none of the papers I attended in the Our 
Criminal Past sessions or at the September 2014 British Crime Historians Symposium dealt in 
any depth with material before the eighteenth century. The titles of papers I missed do not 
suggest that I was simply unlucky in this. 
17
 I am of course aware that these matters are discussed in texts as part of a range of 
dispositions, but I know of no scholarly monograph devoted to these subjects. 
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of ‘rough music’ as a shaming punishment in the middle of the twentieth.18 Some 
mentalities and practices continue to exist for as long as they are deemed effective. 
Not everything changes, or changes everywhere, or changes everywhere at the 
same rate. (Note also the connection here with Propositions 2 and 5). 
 
Proposition 5: Ignorantia iuris quod quisque scire tenetur non excusat 
I have deliberately used lawyers’ language, a legal maxim in fact (‘ignorance of the 
law which everyone is supposed to know is no excuse’). It’s exclusive and excluding 
language and that’s the point. I don’t just mean the Latin, of course, but the way in 
which lawyers speak, irrespective of the root language which they use (and English 
became the only official language of the law as late as 1733: see Proposition 3). 
What I want to examine here is the position which I see being taken towards the law 
in histories of crime and punishment. ‘Crime’ is defined by the content of the criminal 
law, and if you want to depart from that definition then you must have a better 
definition or at the very least explain why you feel it important to deviate from it (see 
my implicit argument from social understanding for including imprisonment for debt 
as a valuable adjunct to our studies). So, simple defamation is not a crime, though I 
have read a long account which treated it as if it was.19 Modes of prosecution, 
jurisdiction, trial structures and procedures, permissible punishments are all legally, 
not (subject to what I’m going to say shortly) socially circumscribed. You certainly 
don’t have to be a historian of the law itself to understand them, but you should be at 
least a little cautious about approaching legal material if you are unsure of it. Not 
certain what a ‘common informer’ is, don’t know the difference between ‘burglary’ and 
‘housebreaking’?20 Well, it might be material, so you might want to check. A legal 
dictionary will often (but not always) be all you need, you can pick up an Osborn for 
next to nothing in almost any second-hand bookshop.21 I repeat, I’m not against 
using a wider or narrower definition of ‘crime’, ‘criminal’ and the like if it is a 
considered and justified definition. If it’s simply the result of ignorance, that’s another 
matter. And I’m not (intentionally) patronising a scholarly audience. It’s just that I’ve 
seen a lot of legal misunderstanding in my time. 
 
                                                          
18
 For discussion see Chs 4 and 5 of Ireland White Gloves? A History of Crime and 
Punishment in Wales (forthcoming, 2015). 
19
 It was a PhD thesis, so no, AR, I’m not naming names. 
20
 The first example here came from a discussion at a conference paper I attended, and no, 
AR, I won’t name names. The second I have invented. 
21
 Osborn’s Law Dictionary has run through many editions. Even an old one serves the 
historian. 
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But paradoxically I want to warn against another trait which I have had cause to 
observe: a too slavish acceptance that what the law and lawyers say represents 
social reality. It doesn’t always. An example will make my readers smile indulgently. 
A distinguished historian, though not one of crime, once asked me whether the two 
eighteenth century soldiers he had come across who had claimed benefit of the 
clergy must have been army chaplains. You will know that such a claim was 
completely artificial, was recognised by all to be so, and may even know that it had 
been so recognised since at least the fourteenth century (note Propositions 3 and 4 
here). But I think that there is a danger, illustrated here, that we assume that the legal 
formula, the ‘official position’, is invariably the dominant position, or at the very least 
that official records mean what they say. That compensation settlement for homicide 
I mentioned above? Well, that’s technically, officially, a grave offence, ‘compounding 
a felony’. It isn’t part of the Victorian legal world-view, but I don’t think that any of 
those involved in it paid any attention to that. If the case had come to trial then the 
jury might have weighed the evidence presented in court and decided accordingly, 
but actually the case came from a county (Carmarthenshire) where, throughout the 
nineteenth century, cases were heard by juries who often did not understand any 
such evidence, because they did not speak English, despite a statute insisting that 
they did. In any event the jury would probably not have been making a finding based 
on the narrow criteria of relevance which the law of evidence increasingly demanded. 
The real question they were answering was not ‘Did he do it’, but ‘What shall we do 
with him?’ We are used to seeing this as an exceptional response, ‘jury equity’, to 
mitigate the death penalty (see Proposition 2) when in reality it is a form of reasoning 
which I think permeates an entire system. If there had been a finding of insanity in 
the case then the defendant might have been transferred to an asylum. These were 
made compulsory for every county in 1845.22 Cardiganshire has still never built one. 
If he had been imprisoned he would have been subject to the ‘silent system’ which 
was the prescribed regime for ‘non-separate’ prisons. Only, despite what was said to 
the Inspector, he wouldn’t: the Governor lets slip at one point in his diary that he 
hasn’t the staff to enforce it.23 I must say too that in the courts of the Justices of the 
Peace with which I am familiar the correspondence between judicial activity and legal 
authority is (clerks notwithstanding) often a matter of accident, certainly in the 
nineteenth century, and sometimes in the twentieth. 
                                                          
22
 See 8 & 9 Vict c.146. A Joint Counties Asylum was built 20 years later, well beyond the 
statutory time limit. There was a similar lack of response to the Prison Act 1865 in the County. 
23
 See Ireland and Ireland (eds.) The Carmarthen Gaoler’s Journal 1845-50 (in two volumes, 
2010) entry for 17 November 1845. 
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This, I confess, may be the Proposition which elicits the most anger in my readers. ‘A 
lawyer tells us not to be too legalistic!’ Has not the very rationale of the social 
historian been to examine substance rather than form? Has not the discipline 
formulated such important concepts as ‘social crime’ which urge us to look beyond 
the bland uniformity of the penal code to find important subdivisions within it? Yes 
and yes. I’m just saying that I’ve noticed a tendency to think that lawyers (and others 
working within the system) say what they mean and mean what they say, that 
formalities are invariably translated into actualities. Well, I do know lawyers for whom 
the objective notion of truth is a paramount guiding principle. I know others for whom 
getting the job done is a more important motor for action. 
 
Proposition 6: Living for the City 
The particular examples which I have used above, concerning stasis and ‘irregularity’ 
within the legal structure are of course explicable in a number of ways. They are not 
typical. They are from a distant, undeveloped part of the jurisdiction. Frankly, they’re 
Welsh! 
 
Much of the history of crime and punishment which we read is predominantly 
metropolitan or at least urban.24 There are, of course, many exceptions, but I’m 
willing to stand by the general proposition (if only for the sake of argument).25 This is 
the paradigm which drives much of current criminal justice policy and criminological 
focus. Most people reading these words will live and work in large towns or cities, 
which is where most universities are still sited. But it was not until 1851 that the 
Census returns showed that the majority of those recorded lived in towns rather than 
the countryside.26 OK, we can debate the crudity of that statement, but not, I think the 
essence of the transformation which it indicates. So now we have to assess which 
type of experience is 'typical', what is rule and what is exception. But let’s assess it, 
not assume it (and remember Proposition 4 as we do so). 
                                                          
24
 'In eighteenth century England crime was overwhelmingly a London phenomenon' F. 
McLynn begins his Crime & Punishment in Eighteenth Century England (Oxford, 1991) 1. 
25
 AR cites King, Cox and Woolnough, and I’ll gladly add Davey, Morgan and Rushden, 
Shakesheff, Chapman and others. But my point remains. We have a number of different 
analyses of crime and punishments in London, we can read one against another. A single 
study of Carmarthenshire or anywhere else isn’t the same. We no longer accept that there’s a 
single 'correct' interpretation of history. Why do we expect our single study of a particular 
county or region to be enough? Can we really pretend that we know as much about Stafford 
Assizes as about the Old Bailey? As much about Haverfordwest Gaol as about Pentonville? 
26
 See, eg, J. Long, 'Rural-Urban Migration and Socioeconomic Mobility in Victorian Britain' 
http://www.colby.edu/economics/faculty/jmlong/research/ruralurban.pdf, 1-2.  
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One of the first sites which I introduce my students to is the wonderful, 
groundbreaking Old Bailey Online (http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/). They love it, and 
I’m not going to criticise it. But I wonder how many students in London are invited to 
examine the available sources from Wales: not merely my own Carmarthenshire 
database mentioned earlier, but the larger, more important one 
(http://www.llgc.org.uk/sesiwn_fawr/index_s.htm) produced by Glyn Parry and his 
team at the National Library of Wales which makes available a century of Great 
Sessions criminal proceedings (note Proposition 1. Don’t know what Great Sessions 
are? See Propositions 3 and 5). But this Welsh stuff is parochial, marginal, different! 
Is it?27 How do you know? Until I’ve seen a lot more work on the criminal justice 
history of Cumbria, Gloucestershire or Shropshire I won’t know how ‘different’ these 
Welsh findings really are, whether the very real cultural variables of language and 
religion outweigh the socio-economic ones of rurality and settlement patterns. I can 
make arguments about that, but I can’t assume it. I’m not here pressing a stupid 
point. I know that London is the heart of government, the source of law. It’s not just 
another place. I know too that there is some good work in rural crime, and I really 
don’t want to argue that everyone should read about Welsh criminal history. I want us 
to reflect upon the paradigms which we take into our work. And again, my contention 
is that this reflection will help to tease out not only neglected bits of a story, but may 
challenge the familiar ones. Let’s go back to the prison history argument I put forward 
earlier (see Propositions 2, 3 and 4). I don’t want to make this an attack on 
Foucauldian theory (I hugely admire it, it has changed the way I think) but what if 
instead of the creation of a Panoptical society we look at the nineteenth century as 
an attempt to reconstruct in an urban environment, in institutions rather than more 
pervasively, that which had previously been a familiar feature of life outside it. As 
Matthew Davenport Hill put it in 1852, 'in small towns there must be a sort of natural 
police, of a very wholesome kind, operating on the conduct of every individual, who 
lives, as it were, under the public eye. But in a large town, he lives, as it were, in 
absolute obscurity.'28 It’s obvious to him, why should it be lost on us?  
 
                                                          
27
 The other approach is to assume that it’s simply the same: the great Clive Emsley 
apparently says (in a confusingly ambiguous comment) that the legal system in Wales was 
‘indistinguishable’ from that in England (Crime and Society in England 1750-1900 (3
rd
 ed, 
Harlow, 2005),1). That simply isn’t the case: it had a different superior criminal court for more 
than half of the period covered by his book. Work has been done on the Great Sessions 
database by Woodward and by Walliss. 
28
 Quoted in Y. Levin and A. Lindesmith, 'English ecology and criminology of the past century', 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 801 (1927), 804. 
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I really enjoyed the Our Criminal Past meetings which I attended. They exposed me 
to people and ideas which challenged the way I thought about the work I do. So I am 
greatly in the debt of those who organised, gave papers to and otherwise participated 
in those sessions. I offer these observations in return, as a relative outsider, in the 
hopes that they might entertain, and gently caution, my new-found friends. I think that 
some will still feel that I have set up straw men to knock down and I’ll happily 
concede that there’s a degree of stuffing in the propositions. My aim throughout is 
simply to make us challenge our own preconceptions. 
